OM in the News: The Navy’s Learning Curve Problem

Huntington Ingalls., the sole U.S. builder of aircraft carriers, continues to fall short of the Navy’s demand to cut labor expenses to stay within an $11.39 billion cost cap mandated by Congress on the second in a new class of warships, reports Industry Week (Aug. 17, 2018). With about 47% of construction complete on the USS John F. Kennedy, the Navy figures show the contractor isn’t yet meeting the goal it negotiated with the service: reducing labor hours by 18% from the first carrier, the USS Gerald Ford, which at $13 billion has become the costliest warship ever. They’re the first two of a planned, 4-vessel, $55 billion program.

USS Gerald R. Ford at Newport News Shipyard

It took about 49 million hours of labor to build the Ford. The Navy’s goal for the Kennedy is to reduce that to about 40 million hours. Huntington Ingalls’s performance “remains stable at approximately 16%” less, said spokesman for the Navy. “Key production milestones and the ship’s preliminary acceptance date remain on track” and there are “ample opportunities for improvement with nearly 4 years until contract delivery and over 70% of assembly work remaining on the vessel.” Navy officials have cited what they describe as progress on the Kennedy as one justification for buying the 3rd and 4th Ford-class carriers under a single contract.

The Navy assesses that, although difficult, the shipbuilder can still attain the 18% reduction goal, said a spokesman. The Navy Secretary, who’s been closely monitoring the carrier program, said that Huntington Ingalls has been on “an impressive learning curve” in reducing labor costs. But a director with the GAO, who monitors Navy shipbuilding, said “with so much of the program underway, it is unlikely that the Navy will regain efficiency. In later phases of a shipbuilding contract, performance typically degrades, not improves.”

Classroom discussion questions:

  1. Why are learning curves so important in ship construction?
  2. What learning curve is the goal? What is the current rate?

 

OM in the News: From Navy Oil Tankers to Amazon’s Diapers

8 ships returning to Caroline Islands anchorage, 1944
8 ships returning to Caroline Islands anchorage, 1944

Amazon’s online diaper sales and the U.S. Navy’s refueling protocol for World War II appear unrelated and worlds apart. Nevertheless, they are both answers to an identical logistics problem: how can an organization shorten the time between a customer’s order and a supplier’s response?

Amazon is seeking a way to decrease its response time to online buyers. In the case of diapers, this means encouraging a supplier such as P&G to relocate its operations adjacent to Amazon’s warehouses. With co-location, both firms presumably can reduce their shipping costs, better manage their inventories, and speed up deliveries.

The Navy experienced a similar logistics problem during World War II, writes The Wall Street Journal (Nov.25, 2013). In the early months of the war, the Pacific fleet engaged in hit-and-run tactics; it had to return to Pearl Harbor, where its oil supply tanks were located. When the Navy launched a 1943 offensive in the central Pacific, the geographical distance between consumer (fleet) and supplier (Hawaii) widened. Refueling consumed a precious commodity—time.

One  logistic solution: seize an enemy-held island, convert the island into an advanced base and construct oil storage facilities for the fleet. That worked, but as the Navy accelerated its offensive, it outran the advanced base network. By 1944, the Navy introduced floating bases at Pacific anchorages. Commercial tankers delivered fuel oil to the anchorage, storing oil in barges. A gap, though, between oil demand and supply still persisted.

Then the Navy turned logistics on its head, dispatching 36 oilers to meet carrier task force units at prearranged locations in the forward area. Oilers now refueled fleet units on the move in “underway replenishment.” The results were dramatic. A carrier task force could remain free from a fixed base for 3 months. Fleet Admiral Nimitz termed the Pacific just-in-time supply chain as his “secret weapon.” Naval historians would describe Nimitz’s logistic plan as a “fleet within a fleet.” Amazon’s co-location has been called a “plant within a plant.”

Classroom discussion questions:

1. How is co-location used in the auto industry?

2. What are the supply chain problems for the US military in the Afganistan war?