
Spirit AeroSystems is going full circle, from part of Boeing to independent supplier and now back to part of Boeing, reports The Wall Street Journal (July 3, 2024). It is the perfect example of a realization dawning on corporate America: Outsourcing isn’t all it was once cracked up to be.
The deal’s logic of vertical reintegration makes sense in light of recent history, with air-travel safety likely benefiting from centralized supervision and a simpler workflow between plants. Yet it is also an indictment of what executives in most industries have been doing for three decades. When Boeing sold its Spirit fuselage operations in 2005, consultants and business schools had made outsourcing fashionable. Before the late 1980s it was unusual: Even 7-Eleven was vertically integrated with its own milk-producing cows and candy manufacturing.
Then, in 1989, Eastman Kodak pointed the way by tasking IBM with managing its data center. In 1996, GE showed how offshoring support jobs to low-wage countries such as India could help cut costs. Supply chains spread across the world.
At the core of the outsourcing trend, however, was the idea that an “asset-light” firm focused on intellectual property and its “core” expertise would be better run. With this mindset, jettisoning fuselage operations seemed like a no-brainer. It is a capital-intensive, competitive business that faces a lot of production pressure. It wasn’t just fuselages as we note in Chapter 2’s Global Company Profile: In the 2000s, Boeing outsourced more than 70% of the 787 Dreamliner program. But the problems with becoming an assembler of planes, as opposed to a true manufacturer, gradually became apparent. The company lost control of supply, resulting in years of delays, quality problems, and cost overruns.
Aerospace isn’t the only industry to revive vertical integration. Intel is beefing up chip manufacturing in the U.S., GM is building battery plants and Sweden’s IKEA is acquiring containerships.
One general flaw of the asset-light model is that, over time, firms can lose their innovative edge because a lot of “learning by doing” happens when production processes interact. Another is that low-margin bits of the supply chain get worn down to just a few sources. These may not have the financial muscle to make big investments in times of turmoil, or they may be geopolitically sensitive.
Classroom discussion questions:
- Why did Boeing outsource fuselage production in 2005?
- Why is it vertically reintegrating Spirit in 2024?
But Boeing engineers warned back in 2001 that the company risked losing control of its manufacturing processes and hollowing out its internal capabilities. The move to reacquire Spirit comes after a long series of quality problems with the fuselage sections it supplies. Spirit parts frequently arrive at the factory with defects. Those caused repeated delivery pauses at Boeing’s final assembly plants.











